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altar (of lay "ministers") lest the people get confused about who is 
really in charge here (clerics). Even if a significant number of Catholic 
laity were motivated to find their voices by reading Lakeland's enticing 
volume, and if they were organized in communities of discernment, 
would it matter? As Lakeland says, an "extraordinarily long-lived cul-
ture of lay passivity will be difficult to overcome" (216). But, ecclesi-
astical defiance is the pièce de résistance here. Remember the 1987 
Roman Synod on the laity? Two hundred thousand laypeople involved 
in consultations for a meeting in which nothing happened? About that 
event in 1987, the editors of Commonweal said: it "looked for all the 
world like one of those cardboard congresses periodically called for by 
one-party dictatorships to devise filigree of verbiage around decisions 
made behind the scenes by others" (quoted 125). If this kind of clerical 
resistance is a recurring theme (consultations in the late 1960s led 
nowhere, the issues raised by Call to Action of 1976 were ignored), as 
I think it is, why should the laity care enough to try again? 
Indiana University MARY JO WEAVER 
AUTHOR'S RESPONSE 
Dorothy Day's predilection for what she called "clarification of 
thought" is instructive for us all. None of us possesses the whole truth, 
and surely none of us can solve this or that problem—theological or any 
other—alone. Thought is clarified not through the lone voice, however 
insightful or prophetic, but through the communal discernment that 
occurs through sharing our ideas with one another, testing them out, 
submitting to strong and sincere criticism, receiving and responding in 
a generous spirit. I want, then, warmly to thank my four interlocutors 
for their careful and generous evaluation of my book. In most instances, 
as I shall shortly make clear in some detail, they have identified issues 
of concern that have already occurred to me. No one knows the weak-
nesses of a book better than its author. Consequently, their remarks 
have done me the greatest service by forcing me to confront my own 
authorial decisions, and to revisit the issues they involved. I hope their 
comments and my responses help to further what I am sure we all 
believe to be an important dialogue. 
As Dennis Doyle so accurately suggests, my book falls somewhere 
between an academic study and a manifesto. I could not be more in 
agreement with him on this point, though I am less uncomfortable with 
this situation than he is. I would want to say that the character of the 
book is dictated by the nature of the problem it addresses. In any case, 
I think that a contemporary venture in ecclesiology cannot begin until 
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we sort out the proper relationship between what we have traditionally 
called clergy and laity. Otherwise, our thinking about the church will 
have piecemeal value at best, and at worst be a simple reflection of our 
many dysfunctionalities. My conviction then is that we need to attend 
to what it is to be a Christian, what it is to be baptized into the church. 
This, in modern parlance, is the default mode. When we approach the 
church in this way, all of us are called to be holy, priestly and apostolic. 
Lumen Gentium has said no less. But the teaching of Vatican II enters 
a church marked by its history, and while the theological vision is 
intended as a corrective to the errors that have crept in over the cen-
turies, the sedimentation of those errors in the institution means that a 
process of cleansing and reformation is necessary if we are to hear the 
words of the Council fathers clearly. 
The first half of my book is an effort to sketch a history of the 
theological fortunes of the laity in the church. Doyle sees the early 
pages as an effort to characterize the lay/clergy distinction as one that 
is inessential, historically-contingent, that "the church of today is free 
to revise" or "to do away with." I am sure that the brevity of my dis-
cussion of the early church—for which I think I can be justly criti-
cized—has contributed to this perception, and I welcome the opportu-
nity to clarify my position. In sorting through the views of Yves Congar, 
Alexandre Faivre and Ignace de la Potterie on the meaning of "lay" and 
"clergy" in the early centuries of the church, one encounters some 
differences. But there is also considerable common ground. While de la 
Potterie, unlike the other two, thinks that the term "lay" may have been 
used to identify a class of people within the church who did not exer-
cise ministerial leadership, all three would agree that laity and clergy 
were not at first understood to be in a hierarchical relationship with 
one another, not of power, nor of virtue, nor of worth. The importance 
of this insight is to throw into sharp relief the subsequent development 
of a negative definition of laity. And while a definition of laity as not 
clergy and not monks is not in itself inaccurate, it does not actually say 
anything about what the laity are. Which is where the problems begin. 
Doyle has raised the more important issue, however, which is 
whether or not the historical judgment that the lay/clergy distinction 
only developed over time means that it is not an essential distinction in 
the church, and thus can be dispensed with at the will of the appro-
priate authorities. The answer to this really depends on whether we 
understand the lay/clergy distinction as it has developed in the church 
as essential to the apostolicity of the church. In my view, following 
Congar's modifications of his earlier and less cogent views, the estab-
lishment of the leadership of the apostles does not precede the calling 
of the larger group, but is more or less coincident with calling that 
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larger group. Thus, apostolic leadership, which for us means the de-
velopment of the episcopacy which is its true descendent, is a given in 
the church. No bishops, no church. Other clerical ministerial roles in 
the church, which means priesthood and diaconate, are venerable and 
perhaps should never be dispensed with, but they do not share the 
same theological status as that of the episcopacy. I certainly have dif-
ficulty imagining the church without them. But I have no difficulty at 
all—and this may be where Doyle's problems with my position come 
from—in imagining them completely freed from what I am convinced 
are historically contingent issues like the gender of the priest, celibacy 
or, for that matter, sexual orientation. 
To return to the suggestion that I have fallen between two stools, 
that of a measured theological treatment of my subject and that of a call 
to arms, it is my view that in this matter the two are inseparable. A 
careful theological assessment of the place of the laity in the church's 
life and theological reflection, which I have tried to provide in the first 
half of the book, suggests the need for major reforms in the way in 
which the laity live out their baptismal vocations. Lay unrest requires 
theological justification. Theology without consequences is sterile: ac-
tion without theology is directionless. But in this particular case the 
theological examination of the status of the laity leads to conclusions 
which the current structures of the church do not allow for. Lay voice, 
lay leadership, lay initiative and lay concern have no institutional 
home in the current church, have no structures through which they can 
be legitimately exercised. The only conclusion is then that something 
about the structures must change. Most people in the church arrive at 
this kind of conclusion, if they do at all, out of a sense of dissatisfaction, 
or anger at the current crisis, or a mixture of both. All I am trying to 
show in the first half of the book is that it is equally possible to arrive 
at similar conclusions by subjecting the history of a theology of the laity 
to serious scrutiny. Calls for a greater role for laity in the church can 
then be identified with a little more confidence as the voice of the 
Spirit. If this makes my book a manifesto, I plead guilty. 
Dennis Doyle recognizes some value in my book, but his overall 
judgment is that it is "one-sided and polarizing." He thinks I cannot 
make my mind up whether to be a theologian or a polemicist. And he 
asks, "does not the current crisis in the church call for solutions that 
move us beyond left-right dichotomies rather than exaggerate them?" I 
think it is pretty clear that we would all want to say a resounding "yes!" 
to this question. The church is not in need of factions, and of the 
oversimplifications that inevitably accompany overheated responses to 
real but complex problems. And there is no question that my own 
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beliefs about a host of ecclesial issues would have to be classified as 
liberal rather than conservative. I certainly want unity and reconcilia-
tion in the church, but am I guilty, however unwittingly, of exacerbat-
ing the very problem I set out to solve? It is certainly possible. 
I suppose I would have to say that the way in which we can move 
beyond left/right dichotomies is not by imagining that differences do 
not exist, nor by assuming that a centrist position is always the correct 
one, so much as by providing the space in which more conservative 
and more liberal points of view can be exchanged. Through dialogue, 
thought is clarified. Of course, many liberals simply dismiss their more 
conservative counterparts, and vice-versa. This is never helpful and 
often harmful. It would happen less often if there were a public space 
in the church in which differences could be aired. Sectors of the church 
may not be ready for this, as Cardinal Bernardin discovered in launch-
ing his Common Ground Initiative. But we are currently caught in a 
classic "Catch-22." No greater role for the laity in the church will be 
forthcoming until structures are created which make that role possible. 
But no such structures seem likely to be created until laity have more 
of a say in the life of their church. 
Three of my four colleagues seem to have problems, greater or 
smaller, with my discussion of "secularity." I am not surprised at this, 
and I readily grant that there is much more to be said here to unpack the 
picture. Given the way that this part of the argument seems to be a 
flash-point for criticism (and not only with the present reviewers), it 
could no doubt have been done with more clarity. For example, when 
Doyle comments that I make the claim that the secular world is "the 
only world there is," he is surely correct that I say that, but I certainly 
did not want to imply that the secular world is the only reality there is. 
Nowhere would I wish to collapse God into the world. Susan Ross asks 
about the same chapter of the book, whether or not there is a conflict 
between my vision of secularity and any notion of transcendence. And, 
if there is, how can that allow for a continuing value for symbols, or for 
the kinds of traditional devotions that she rightly says I am at pains to 
preserve. And Bradford Hinze makes his most challenging point with 
reference to just the same issue. Hinze thinks that my theology of secu-
larity may be an over-correction that strengthens the unconditionality 
of the world and the call for human freedom at the price of any space 
for the working of divine grace. Then, he wonders, what happens to the 
strength that comes from this grace to fund worship, service and "even 
work for justice in the world." 
My theology of secularity is not intended to reduce Christian life to 
ethics, nor to substitute a stiff-necked or stoical Pelagianism for an 
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openness to the mystery and the grace of God. My concern is not to 
reduce or eliminate transcendence, but to elevate the theological status 
of the world. In the language of the nascent twentieth-century theology 
of the laity, even in the early work of Congar, the theological emphasis 
on the secularity of the laity cannot have any other effect than to put the 
world down. The clergy, by contrast, are distinguished by their atten-
tion to the life beyond. Thus, we are left to draw no other conclusion 
that that this life is less important than the life to come, this life is in the 
end merely instrumental to transcendence. It is as if we have left be-
hind the pre-modern living within the mystery of God, only to fall into 
the hands of the Enlightenment bifurcation of the secular and the reli-
gious. In my opinion, a dualism of transcendence and immanence is 
the moment of demythologization, perhaps a necessary antithesis to the 
pre-modern world's lack of space for genuine human freedom. My 
thoughts about secularity are most emphatically not a celebration of the 
uncoupling of human life from reference to God, but an attempt— 
however haltingly and poorly expressed—to find a second naïveté for 
our postmodern context and the church that must proclaim the gospel 
within it. Traditionally, theological thinking interprets the world as an 
instrument in the divine plan, whether as the place in which human 
beings must work out their salvation, or as that which must be re-
deemed. I am simply trying to explore what would happen if we re-
verse the process, and make worldly reality the lens through which we 
discern the plan of God. 
Perhaps our theological problem begins with the error of thinking 
that Scripture tells us more about God than it does. Obviously, the 
Bible is not about God but about God's activity in the world. God 
creates a world. God creates human beings to be in the world. The sin 
of Adam and Eve does not lead to their expulsion from Heaven into the 
world, but from the Garden of Eden, a place already in the world. 
Nothing in Genesis, it seems to me, says the world is changed because 
of Adam and Eve. But they are changed, in the sense that the presence 
of God, while continuing to be real, is occluded, and the human race 
must find its way back to God. The fact of sin means that we cannot find 
our own way back. We need the help of God, given above all, perhaps, 
in the capacity even of fallen humanity to recognize mystery. Is it not 
the case that this is a matter of being open to the occluded presence of 
God, and is such a notion not in fact as good a definition of faith as we 
might come upon? Faith in the Resurrection, for example, is faith in a 
powerful act of God that occurs within the world. Jesus is not raised 
beyond the world, but raised in the world. The resurrected Jesus is a 
symbol, if I may respond directly to Ross here, but not of the subordi-
nation of earthly reality to supernatural reality. He is a symbol of the 
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power of God to transform earthly existence. Christian faith in the 
Resurrection is faith in the living presence of the resurrected Christ in 
the world, testimony to the power of God to transform human life. 
Much of the debate that my discussion of secularity seems to have 
occasioned stems from the phrase, "the unconditionality of the hu-
man." It certainly sounds, out of context, like a denial of transcen-
dence, and there may be better ways to say the same thing. But the idea 
grows out of a discussion of the work of William Lynch, and depends 
on a clear distinction between the figure of Prometheus and the ideol-
ogy of Prometheanism. The latter is an assertion that the worldly is all 
there is. The former, in the thought of Lynch at least, is a recognition 
that the worldly is what God has given us to work with. There is a real 
convergence between God's gift of the world, Nietzsche's advice to "be 
faithful to the earth," and Ignatius of Loyola's insistence that we should 
act as if everything depends upon us, but pray as if everything depends 
upon God. Nietzsche would not like it, but a Christian rephrasing of 
Zarathustra's words might be, "be faithful to the gift, and you will be 
faithful to the giver." 
Ross also challenges me on the excessively anthropocentric focus 
of "the unconditionality of the human." She is absolutely right. 
Though, I plead at once, this is an unintentional error. What I should 
have made clear is that "the truly human" can only be understood by 
the kind of meditation on what it means to be at home in the world that 
leads quickly to the recognition of the interdependence of all living 
things—indeed, to the far greater dependence of the "higher" upon the 
"lower" life forms. But even if I had been clearer on this point, there is 
a deeper insight in Ross's challenge. Stress the interdependence all you 
like, be as ecologically sensitive as you like, if one understands the 
world fundamentally as God's gift, does this not, however subtly, make 
the rest of creation the instrument of human enjoyment of the gift? 
Pursuing this would rapidly get us into deep waters. I think this ques-
tion of anthropocentricity is a serious one. In the end it seems to me, if 
we can get beyond God in Genesis clearly providing the world as a 
place for human beings, we should focus on the gratuity of the gift. The 
world is God's gift to itself. Existence is purely gratuitous—why is there 
something rather than nothing? Just because the giver gave! But the gift 
is appreciated in different ways, according to the nature of the recipi-
ent. The world gives glory to God, though most of the world does not 
know that it does so, simply by being itself. Human consciousness 
means openness to the awareness that the world is gift, and of course 
the capacity to problematize the gift. Moreover, the human tendency to 
think anthropocentrically is certainly at the heart of the ecological cri-
sis. The theological challenge for human beings is to reject the notion 
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that God gives us the world, and to replace it with the idea that God 
gives us life as part of the entire living organism of creation. Surely the 
stars in the sky should tell us that much. But then, maybe we have to 
recognize that redemption is for us alone. We are the only part of the 
world that is fallen. The heavens continue to proclaim the glory of God. 
And will still be doing so, even if humanity's own self-destructive 
behavior removes us entirely from the scene. 
Mary Jo Weaver offers me a different kind of challenge. Like Ross's 
final point, it comes down to a question about my "optimism." Weaver 
does not see that the laity, not even the young, have the will to make the 
necessary changes in the church. Even if all my proposals for renewal 
in church life were implemented, it would not matter because so many 
of the laity would remain passive and the institutional church would 
outfox us anyway. Ross, in similar vein, thinks that imagination, energy 
and focus may be missing in the church, and that consumerism may 
overwhelm the necessary counter-cultural and prophetic edge. 
Well, this is a pretty kettle of fish! On the one hand I am perhaps 
justifiably criticized for at least seeming to put too much in the hands 
of human beings and not leaving enough for God to do, and then I am 
told that it is not going to work! Of course it will not work, if we just 
look at the long sorry story of human effort. Is it disingenuous of me to 
respond simply that I am not optimistic but I am hopeful? To argue that 
meditation on the unconditionality of the human brings new meaning 
to the divine assertion that "my grace is enough for you"? To suggest 
that the atheistic critics were right when they pointed out that dualistic 
thought leads to the subordination and alienation of the human? To 
propose that apathy and despair come from not taking up the human 
task, not from finding it too much to ask? To insist that the Spirit of God 
is within us, and that faith in human possibility is part of taking the gift 
of God seriously? I hope not, if only because loss of confidence in the 
human capacity to deal with the problems of the world is not the 
prelude to trusting in God, but the prelude to despair. 
Fairfield University PAUL LAKELAND 
